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Abstract
The understanding of the factors and conditions under which humans and other
animals fail to adjust to changing circumstances is still incomplete. One
possibility has to do with the role of social influences that might favor or
hinder adequate control by contingencies. Three experiments are presented in
which one such factor was manipulated, the presence of a coattending
individual. Shared attention has been found to enhance cognitive resources
devoted to a task in a variety of experimental settings. Participants played
a computerized version of the Rock-Paper-Scissors game which was programmed
so that a particular choice would be more likely to win than the remaining
two within a block. The allocation of behavior towards these choices was used
as a measure of the participants’ ability to track unannounced changes in the
probabilities of the program’s choices and considered a measure of
sensitivity. Although, shared attention had little effect on the overall
outcomes, it had unsystematic effects on the participants’ strategy (Exp. 1).
A significant effect of the sequence of block presentation was found when a
progressively more discriminable sequence of blocks was compared to a
progressively less discriminable one (Exp. 2). Early failure appeared to
hinder effective control by the programmed probabilities. This effect is
attributed to verbal behavior concurrent to performance. In support of this,
providing participants with accurate instructions increased the overall
accuracy, and these instructions were still followed to an extent when they
became inaccurate (Exp. 3). Instructions had an immediate effect in the
participant’s strategy, reflected in a reduced tendency to shift strategy
following losses and, particularly, draws. Further manipulations of shared
attention are required to ascribe a particular role of this social phenomenon
to the rigidity of behavior and other instances of suboptimal choice.
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1. Introduction
In the face of the ever-changing environmental conditions that animals
have to continuously adapt to, it might seem a tautology that the ability to
respond flexibly to such changes has adaptive value. It might seem less
obvious that some behavioral rigidity is also of adaptive value, until one
considers how inefficient our lives would be if we had to learn everything
anew, if we had, for instance, to find our way from home to work every day
(cf. James, 1890, chapter 4). These different aspects and gradations of
adaptation are well represented in folk language in words like “tenacity,”
“stubbornness,” “plasticity” or “stiffness” among many others, that focus the
attention in the fuzzy borders at which persistence stops being useful and
starts becoming a barrier.
Not surprisingly, then, psychology has been interested in the
distinction for a very long time (see Schultz & Searleman, 2002, for a review
of 100 years of the psychological study of rigidity and flexibility), and the
distinction, fuzzy as it is, between positive and negative effects of
rigidity in the face of changing environmental contingencies is arguably at
the root of the old concept of “habit,” which was central to the thought of
the school of functionalism, inspired by William James and others. The
related constructs of behavioral rigidity and behavioral flexibility have
been studied under a number of different names almost from the start of
psychology as an independent discipline: persistence, adherence,
perseveration, stereotypy, compulsion, plasticity, and many others (cf.
Schultz & Searleman, 2002).
Underlying these differing approaches is a concern with optimal
behavior, the ability (or inability) to adapt to changing circumstances. It
is perhaps due to the variety of guises and approaches under which the study
of flexible-rigid behavior has been addressed that despite a long history,
this area of inquiry remains largely unexplored, regardless of its importance
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in the understanding of adaptive behavior in general, and its relevance to a
number of applied concerns, including topics as diverse and apart as the
nature of compulsive behavior in OCD-diagnosed patients, attitude change,
compliance with clinical recommendations, child food neophobia, or obedient
aggression, to name but a few.
With such a large variety of somewhat related phenomena it’s not
surprising that nothing close to a consensus has been arrived at the simple
definition of both rigidity and flexibility. Ionescu (2011), for example,
collected thirteen definitions of cognitive flexibility in the experimental
literature between 2003 and 2010. Schultz and Searleman (2006) favor a
conception that is akin to that advanced by Gestalt psychologists in the area
of problem solving, with the critical element being that of a “mental or
behavioral set, [...] a learned mental or behavioral pattern that forms
through repeated experience in a given situation” (Schultz & Searleman, 2006,
p. 170). Such mental sets, according to Schultz and Searleman, are further
characterized by their “perseverance.” In recent years, the emphasis has been
on the related notion of “cognitive flexibility” (e.g., Ionescu, 2011), that
covers aspects as different as switching among tasks and overcoming
functional fixedness.
Furthermore, the study of the behavioral rigidity-flexibility continuum
can be roughly divided in two broad traditions. First is the “trait” or
correlational approach, exemplified by the early work of both Charles
Spearman and R. B. Cattell, both of whom viewed “rigidity” as a personality
trait interfering with effective behavior in novel circumstances (see Chown,
1959, for a review). As a “trait” approach, the construct is addressed by way
of personality inventories and the like, and then contrasted with behavioral
measures to determine whether, and to what extent, rigidity predicts
clinically or otherwise relevant patterns of behavior (e.g., eating
disorders, academic achievement, or response to treatment).
2

Although the Rigidity-as-trait approach is maybe fundamental for the
comprehension of the phenomenon, a second topic of interest regarding the
flexibility/rigidity continuum is what we could call the “Rigidity-as-state”
approach that emphasizes the occurrence of rigid behavior as a function of
contextual factors. Since the research herein presented can be categorized in
this latter experimental tradition, it will be briefly reviewed next.
1.1. The Experimental Analysis of Rigidity and Flexibility
Insofar as it emphasizes the understanding of environmental factors
promoting or hindering rigid behavior in particular circumstances, the
“Rigidity-as-state” approach might be described more appropriately as
“experimental,” as contrasted with the more correlational emphasis of the
trait approach. Methodologically, this experimental approach often involves
an organism facing a task or problem that requires adjustment to changing
circumstances, and is typical of the studies in behavioral flexibility in
species other than humans, generally by using the “discrimination–reversal
learning task” (Izquierdo & Jentsch, 2012; Klanker, Feenstra & Denys, 2013).
This task involves the simultaneous presence of two stimuli, a response
to one of which (formally called an S+ or SD) is typically followed by food,
while a response to the other (the S— or SΔ) has no associated consequence.
Once the positive and negative discriminations are well established
(generally after many sessions) the functions of the stimuli are reversed,
such that that a response to the previously negative stimulus is now the one
followed by food, and vice versa. The rigidity/flexibility of the
discrimination behavior is operationalized as the time or number of trials it
takes for the organism to adjust to the reversed stimulus functions (see
Izquierdo & Jentsch, 2012, for a brief review).
Renewed interest in this task has appeared as a result of the
relatively recent emphasis on individual consistency in patterns of behavior
in the guise of “behavioral syndromes” (e.g., Sih, Bell & Johnson, 2004; Sih,
3

Bell, Johnson & Ziemba, 2004). The flexibility of behavior of numerous
species has been tested with this procedure, and in a variety of sensory
modalities and behaviors (see e.g., Bond, Kamil & Balda, 2007 for its use
with corvids, and see McMillan, Hahn, Congdon, et al., 2017, for a recent
study with chickadees).
In the case of humans, while the task has been used as a measure of
rigidity, the interest has been typically in underpinning the neural
mechanisms underlying the reversal rather than in the study of the
environmental conditions that favor or hinder flexible behavior, and
accordingly most of this research has focused on lesion studies conducted
with clinical populations (e.g., Hornak, O’Doherty, Bramham, et al., 2004; Xue
et al., 2013). Human participants with no neurological lesions typically show
fast discrimination learning and fast reversal learning even during a single
session (e.g., Ghahremani et al., 2010), unlike studies in other species
which often require many daily sessions.
1.1.1 The experimental study of behavioral rigidity in humans. Due to
the limitations of the discrimination reversal task to measure adaptation to
changing contingencies in normally developing, non-clinical populations (and
particularly the fact these individuals tend to excel readily in such tasks)
alternative methods of studying rigid/flexible behavior in humans have been
used. One set of approaches comes from studies on problem-solving by Gestalt
psychologists. What is characteristic of these studies is that, after
successful problem solving, a novel problem is introduced.
In Luchins and Luchins’ ‘water jugs problem’ (Luchins, 1942; Luchins &
Luchins, 1959), for example, participants are required to solve a number of
easy arithmetical problems (calculating how to measure a particular amount of
water by using three hypothetical jars of different volumes) all of which can
be solved in the same way. Novel problems are then introduced, some of which
can be solved in the usual way, but can also be solved in an easier manner,
4

and some of which can only be solved by using the easier method. Luchins and
Luchins noticed that typically most participants who were exposed to the
initial problems failed to use the simpler solution when the other one was
available, and were mostly unable to find out the simpler solution in
extinction problems. According to the Luchins, the first problem produced an
Einstellung effect, a mental or problem-solving set that prevented
participants from discovering a novel situation.
Similar concepts related to rigid behavior developed from Gestalt
psychology include those of functional fixedness and negative transfer. More
recently, and inspired by cognitive models another set of methods for the
study of these patterns of behaviors has become increasingly common. One of
them is the “attentional set shifting” paradigm, which involves participants
learning a discrimination depending on some physical variable (e.g., color)
and then being tested in novel discriminations that depend on a different
stimulus dimension (e.g., size) (see Ionescu, 2011, for an overview of these
methods; see also, Koch, Poljac, Müller & Kiesel, A., 2018, for a review of
recent methodological advances in the context of so-called “multitasking”;
Vandierendonck Liefooghe & Verbruggen, 2010)).
1.2. The Study of Rigidity in the Experimental Analysis of Behavior
A final field of unrelated research that can be included in this broad
categorization of experimental approaches to rigid/flexible behavior
corresponds to an experimental tradition that developed mostly in the 1980s
and 1990s in the area of human operant research, within the larger field of
the experimental analysis of behavior developed by B. F. Skinner and his
students. These studies originated in applied, clinical contexts where verbal
instructions were used to facilitate the acquisition of socially-appropriate
behaviors (see Vaughan, 1989, for a historical review). Verbal instructions
were generally found to be quite helpful in reducing the time required to
learn these discriminations, but it was later found that they might also
5

prevent participants from detecting unannounced changes in the experimental
contingencies (Hayes, Zettle & Rosenfarb, 1989).
These early results gave way to a number of experiments where
participants received verbal instructions about the most effective manner to
respond in operant learning tasks that involved pressing a lever or a button
which produced points or some other consequence according to particular
schedules of reinforcement, and then changing the schedule of reinforcement
without announcement (see Hayes, Zettle & Rosenfarb, 1989, for a review). If
participants’ behavior remained unchanged despite the change in
contingencies, as was often the case, their behavior was said to be
insensitive to contingencies (e.g., Shimoff, Catania, and Matthews, 1981).
For instance, in the experiments by Matthews et al. (1977), even minimal
instructions were enough to generate patterns of responding that were
incongruent with the scheduled contingencies.
A number of factors have been shown to alter sensitivity to changing
contingencies in human performance under schedules of reinforcement. Galizio
(1979) found that only when the schedule incorporated “response cost” (money
loss) as a consequence for not responding, did subjects respond more
sensitively, which led him to conclude that insensitivity occurs as a result
of failing to come into contact with the contingencies: instructions might
generate behavior that prevents participants’ from experiencing the
discrepancy between the instructions and current contingencies. For example,
an instruction to respond rapidly (e.g., according to a Variable Ratio
schedule) might engender such high rates of behavior that participants might
not realize that, unannounced to them the schedule of reinforcement was
changed to one of interval in which it is the timing of responding rather
than its frequency that determines the delivery of a reinforcer.
In support of this view, when instructions are vague and imprecise but
do not directly contradict the contingencies, responding is often insensitive
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(Buskist, Bennett & Miller, 1981; Ninness & Ninness, 1998), and the degree of
discrepancy between instructions and contingencies correlates highly with
sensitivity (DeGrandpre & Buskist, 1991; Hackenberg & Joker, 1994; cf. Fox &
Kyonka, 2017). Newman, Buffington and Hemmes (1995) found that regardless of
the accuracy of the instructions, responding was only sensitive when every
response was reinforced. A history of variable responding (e.g., having been
exposed to a number of different schedules of reinforcement rather than to a
single one) also increases sensitivity (Baumann, Abreu-Rodrigues & Souza,
2009; Joyce & Chase, 1990; LeFrancois, Chase & Joyce, 1988).
A second, complementary approach to this phenomenon emphasizes the role
of social influences (Hayes, Brownstein, Haas & Greenway, 1986; Hayes,
Brownstein, Zettle, Rosenfarb & Corn, 1986), arguing that instructions bring
into play additional (extra-experimental) contingencies related to a social
history of complying with instructions and norms. These extra-experimental
contingencies “compete” with experimental contingencies for the control of
behavior. In this way, it’s not that the behavior is as a rule less sensitive
to contingencies, but rather that it’s sensitive to extra-experimental (often
implicit) contingencies (e.g., that you’re expected to be compliant in an
experiment). Hence, when both verbal instructions and direct contingencies
are present, as in the typical experiments, responding might be sensitive to
both types of contingencies or just to one, depending on which proves to be
most advantageous to a participant.
Further evidence for the role of social factors in the rigidity of
behavior was found in a study by Cerutti (1994), where some participants were
told that they were being videotaped while they responded in a typical
instructed operant task, resulting in higher levels of insensitivity.
Likewise, Kroger-Costa & Abreu-Rodrigues (2012) found that the presence of
the experimenter throughout the experimental session produced insensitive
responding, as compared to the responding of subjects who were alone.
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Although this paradigm within the broader field of the experimental
analysis of human behavior provided some insights and pointed to interesting
aspects of the complex continuum of behavioral rigidity and flexibility,
experimental attention has dwindled in the last two decades, and few of these
studies have been conducted in this decade. There are many reasons for this
decline, among which is the increased interest in the research areas of
symbolic behavior and derived stimulus relations. Another possibility is that
too much emphasis was placed on arguing that humans were “less sensitive” to
contingencies (see e.g., Kollins, Newland, & Critchfield, 1997; Madden,
Chase, & Joyce, 1998), which led to a number of debates on the nature of
sensitivity and the procedural differences in the study of human and nonhuman
behavior. Arguably, many researchers were happy with showing that human
behavior appeared “sensitive” to contingencies under particular conditions;
thus, instead of pursuing some of the issues raised with human research, the
whole paradigm was almost forgotten, and the baby had been thrown with the
bathwater.
Whatever the case, with the reduced interest in the paradigm a number
of potentially interesting issues that could be considered highly relevant in
the understanding of human behavior in laboratory conditions and that could
be procedurally addressed were simply relegated. One instance of this, which
is the focus of the present research, is the analysis of social influences in
the relative “rigidization” of behavior that is observed as a result of
presenting instructions. With the exception of the study of Kroger-Costa and
Abreu-Rodrigues (2012), almost no research has attempted to identify the role
of social variables in the sensitivity to changing experimental
contingencies.
Moreover, since the emphasis in the original studies was in the typical
patterns of behavior under particular schedules of reinforcement (for
example, whether humans exhibit the scallop patterns observed in other
8

species when responding under Fixed Interval schedules), the apparatus were
essentially computerized versions of a Skinnner box, with participants
receiving points in exchange for pressing a button in the keyboard. There is
nothing particularly problematic in this, but as a result of this
technicality the rate of responses became the most common dependent variable
across these experiments, with “sensitivity” being a synonym for changes (or
lack thereof) in these rates as a function of unannounced changes in the
schedules of reinforcement.
The rate of responding, although certainly important to understand the
behavioral control of particular natural or artificial contingencies of
reinforcement and punishment, is limited in terms of ecological validity in
that the reinforcement (and punishment) of many human behaviors doesn’t
depend on the frequency of the behavior but rather on its timing, pertinence,
or duration. As a consequence of this emphasis on traditional research with
schedules of reinforcement, I’d argue, no study on instructional control has
explored sensitivity in the context of choice behavior, a very unfortunate
situation insofar as the traditional study of choice has proved successful in
extending interdisciplinary research problems in areas as varied as
behavioral ecology, consumer behavior and behavioral economics, or substance
use disorders.
The research herein presented was conducted with the aim of addressing
some of the gaps in the understanding of social influences on rigidity and
flexibility of behavior in a context of choice. Although there are many
social factors that might be relevant to these issues, we opted to start this
inquiry by focusing on the role of the coattending presence of another person
as one is engaged in a particular task.
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1.3 Exploring Social Influences in Behavioral Rigidity: The Case of Shared
Attention
Although, procedurally, there is much in common between the
methodological approaches to behavioral rigidity/flexibility described
earlier, no unified theoretical framework has been proposed to integrate
these dissimilar bodies of research (Ionescu, 2011; Schultz & Searleman,
2002). More importantly, research about the variables controlling
rigid/flexible behavior is still inconclusive, and has generated little
interest. Renewed interest in the Einstellung effect, however, has
demonstrated that one variable, relatively unexplored, has to do with the way
expert problem-solvers allocate their attention. Bilalić, McLeod and Gobet
(2008) evaluated whether chess expert and master class players would find an
optimal solution to a number of chess problems which could also be solved by
a familiar but suboptimal solution that they had used before. Results showed
that most players opted for the suboptimal solution. Further, when their eye
movements were tracked they found out that players kept directing their gaze
to those squares related to the familiar solution, even though they reported
to be looking for alternatives (see also Sheridan & Reingold, 2013).
According to the authors, this suggests that the Einstellung effect occurs as
a result of the participants’ attention being biased towards those features
associated with the familiar solution, hence preventing the discovery of new
solutions (cf. Galizio, 1979).
A relatively recent body of research has emphasized the social nature
of human attention and its important role in intra-group coordination (see
Shteynberg, 2015, for a review). According to this perspective, the
perception that one is co-attending with others to some aspect of the world
(“shared attention”) leads to directing greater cognitive resources to such
aspects of the world, hence affecting other basic processes such as memory,
motivation, and social learning, among others (Shteynberg, 2015). Shteynberg
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(2010), for example, found evidence that performance in a number of tasks
(e.g., a time pressure requirement, a word recognition task, or a painting
recognition task) was higher for participants who thought that other
individuals (that they perceived as being more similar to themselves) were
co-attending to those tasks.1
If rigid behavior is related to differential patterns of attention as a
result of previous success, it is conceivable that shared attention might
differentially affect the sensitivity of behavior to changing consequences,
an issue that has yet to be explored experimentally. The research herein
described addresses the question of whether experimental manipulation of
shared attention leads to either increased, decreased, or no changes in the
sensitivity of behavior to changes in programmed contingencies.
In order to address this question we have opted for a task that
requires constant adaptation to changing contingencies, and which provides a
quantitative measure of sensitivity, as described by the generalized matching
law (GML; see Appendix I for a brief review and a description of the
quantitative model, and Figure 19 for a schematic representation of how data
are analyzed in this model). The task involves three simultaneous
alternatives, each associated with a different probability of reinforcement,
such that participants must allocate their behavior according to such
probabilities to respond optimally.
The task, developed by Kangas, Berry, Cassidy et al (2009) requires
participants to play a computerized version of the Rock-Paper-Scissors game
which has been programmed such that the probability of each alternative being
the correct one changes across blocks within the experimental session. Kangas
et al. (2009) found that the participants’ behavior matched the programmed

1

Shteynberg has argued that these effects are not mere social facilitation effects insofar as
they occur only when participants consider themselves and co-attending others as belonging to the
same group (i.e., as a “we”).
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probabilities across a number of ten 100-trial blocks, but that nearexclusive responses for the most probable alternative (i.e., overmatching)
was found when accurate verbal instructions were provided. Lie, Baxter and
Alsop (2013) used a brief four-block version of the same task finding again
sensitivity to the changing probabilities, but reduced sensitivity when
participants were told that they were playing against another human
participant versus when they were told that they would be playing against the
computer. It needs to be noted, though, that the literature on choice with
human participants is rather contradictory, with many studies finding that
the matching law described very accurately the choices of participants (see
Pierce & Epling, 1983, for a review), and many others showing significant and
consistent departures from it (e.g., Horne & Lowe, 1993; see also Takahashi &
Shimakura, 1998).
In this research, three experiments were conducted in which
participants took part in a modified version of the choice allocation task
developed by Kangas et al. (2009). The important modification was that
participants completed the task either in the presence (shared attention) or
absence of another individual (a confederate in Experiments 1 and 2, and a
second participant in Experiment 3). While Experiment 1 served as a pilot
study and consisted in a systematic replication of the study by Lie, Baxter
and Alsop (2013), including shared attention conditions, Experiment 2
analyzed social effects as a function of the sequence of presentation of
experimental blocks, and Experiment 3 introduced accurate and inaccurate
verbal instructions.
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2. Experiment 1
As described in the previous section, a computerized version of the
Rock, Paper, Scissors game was used to determine the allocation of behavior
to each particular choice by the computer, whose strategy was programmed so
that it played one option preferentially across most blocks. Using the shared
attention paradigm developed by Shteynberg (2015), participants first
completed a creativity task designed to increase the extent to which
participants feel similar to the confederates. Participants were then
randomly assigned to one of three experimental groups (see Table 2.1; all
Tables can be found in the Appendix section). Participants in the first group
(Solo condition) were presented with the task while they were alone, while
participants in the other two groups did the task in the presence of
confederates who could aurally co-attend to the performance of the
participants.
The first experiment was conducted to determine the feasibility of the
experimental procedure, and its procedure and results are presented next.
Plausibly, the co-attending presence of another individual might enhance the
salience of different aspects of the experimental task. Among such different
factors, we decided to determine first whether shared attention to the
consequences delivered to the participant’s choices would have any effect on
matching. Moreover, we wanted to determine whether enhanced attention to the
participant’s choice pattern of allocation (her/his “strategy”) would have
any subsequent effect in addition to or against that of shared attention on
the strategy’s outcome. Accordingly, participants in the shared-attention
condition were divided in two further groups, differing in the specificity of
the auditory feedback presented after each participant’s choice: in the
Shared-outcome-only condition confederates were only able to hear whether the
participants’ choice was correct or incorrect, while in the Sharedperformance-&-outcome condition the auditory feedback also contained
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information about the participants’ selection (see Table 2.1 for a summary of
the experimental conditions).
2.1 Method
2.1.1 Design
To determine the role of shared attention in the participants’
sensitivity to the changing probabilities of one response being correct,
participants were randomly assigned to one of three groups. Participants in
the first group (Alone condition), completed the task by themselves.
Participants in both the second group (Shared-performance-only condition) and
third group (Shared-performance-&-feedback condition) completed the task
while a confederate was present in the room, with both groups differing on
the type of auditory feedback that was delivered by the computer during each
trial, as described in the procedure section (see Table 2.1).
The probability that one of the three options (i.e., rock, paper, or
scissors) was correct was modified across blocks. Just like in the Lie,
Baxter and Alsop (2013) study, the present experiment involved four blocks.
The probabilities used in the present study were similar to those used in the
Lie et al., study as well, that is, one block where each alternative was as
likely as the other two, and three blocks where the probabilities for each
alternative were 55%, 30%, and 15%, respectively, with either alternative
being the most likely on one block.
2.1.2 Participants
Forty-two undergraduate students participated in the study. They were
randomly assigned to one of the three experimental conditions. Data from
three of the participants were excluded from the analysis because of errors
in the experimental session (e.g., a participant turned off the volume of the
computer). The final data analysis, then, included thirty-nine participants,
with 14 in the Alone condition (female N = 7, mean age = 18.79 years, sd
=1.12), 12 in the Shared-Outcome-Only condition (female N = 6, mean age =
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18.67 years, sd =0.98), and 13 in the Shared-Outcome-&-Performance condition
(female N = 8, mean age = 18.08 years, sd =0.27). Participants received
academic credit for participating in the experiment.
2.1.3 Apparatus and Setting
All experimental sessions were conducted in the Group Attention
Laboratory. Participants sat in individual cubicles where a computer screen
was located above a table. Undergraduate confederates assisting in the task
were sat down in a close cubicle during the experimental session, so that
they had no visual access to the participant’s responding, but were able to
hear the auditory feedback provided by the computer. The experimental task
was programmed in the FlashDevelop (IDE) by using the open-source HaxeFlixel
library, and it was presented to the participants in the standalone Adobe
Flash Player 25. Auditory feedback was delivered by the computer speakers,
located below the table in the cubicle where participants sat down, and were
set up at the highest volume so that anyone could easily hear it from any
part of the experimental room. The volume control options of the computer
were blocked so that participants couldn’t change the sound or mute the
auditory feedback. Sessions lasted about 45 minutes.
2.1.4 Procedure
At the beginning of the session, participants were allowed into the lab
and asked to read an informed consent form. Participants of Groups 2 and 3
sat next to an undergraduate confederate who acted as if she/he were an
unknowing participant. Once they provided consent and any questions by them
were answered, participants (and confederates) were asked to enter the
experimental room and sit at a table where they were presented with a
creativity task consisting of writing up as many uses for a brick as they
could think of for a period of three minutes. Participants from Groups 2 and
3 had to complete this creativity task by collaborating with the
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confederates, who had been previously trained to try to collaborate actively
in the task.
After the creativity task was completed, the experimenter took the
participant (and confederates in the shared conditions) to the cubicle, and
the participant was asked to sit down. Confederates were asked to stand
behind the participant so that the participants were aware that the
confederate could see what occurred in the screen, and could hear the
auditory feedback from the computer. As the participant sat in front of the
computer, the experimenter read the following general instructions, which
were also presented in the screen:
“You will be playing a game of ‘Rock-Paper-Scissors’ against the
computer. The rules are the usual ones:

Rock beats Scissors, but loses

against Paper; Paper beats Rock, but loses against Scissors; and Scissors
beats Paper, but loses against Rock.

If you don’t know how to play this

game, please ask the experimenter to explain. You will make your selection by
clicking the mouse cursor on the option you choose. The computer will make
its selection at the exact same time you do. The winner of each round will
receive one point, and the loser will receive 0 points. If there is a tie,
the score will remain unchanged. Your task is to obtain more points than the
computer, so try to respond in the way that would make you get the most
points. Do you have any questions?”
If no questions were asked, the participants were then told: “Let’s do
some practice, please click continue on the screen. (…) Alright, now you’ll
play a few times until you find a message.” This started a block of five
practice trials where the computer selection of an alternative was completely
random. The trials were identical to those in the actual blocks, as described
below, with the sole difference that they also provided written feedback in
the screen in the form of “Correct. Paper beats Rock” or “Wrong, Scissors
beats Paper.” At the end of the five trials a message appeared in the screen
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asking if they had any questions. Then, participants were told that they
could start whenever they wanted by clicking on “Continue,” and confederates
were asked to sit down in an adjacent cubicle, such that they could clearly
hear the auditory feedback from the computer, but had no visual access to the
participants responding.
At the start of each trial the participants were presented with three
images corresponding to Rock, Paper, and Scissors at the left side of the
screen, while a circle of a similar side with an interrogation mark was
presented on the right side of the screen (see Figure 1). The specific type
of auditory feedback that participants received after making a choice
depended on the experimental condition.
For participants from Group 2 (shared-outcome only), once they selected
one of the options from the screen the two remaining alternatives disappeared
and after three seconds the computer selection appeared, replacing the
previous circle. If the participant had made a correct response (e.g., if the
participant chose Rock and the computer chose Scissors), a green rectangle
appeared behind the participant’s choice, and auditory feedback was played
consisting of the sound of applause for a correct answer, and one point was
added to the participant score counter. If there was a tie (e.g., both
participant and computer choosing “Scissors”) the word “tie” was played, and
no change occurred in the scores. Finally, if they made a wrong choice (e.g.
the participant choosing Paper and the computer choosing Scissors), a red
rectangle appeared behind the choice, a “thunk” tone was played, and the
computer’s score would increase by one. After a 5-s inter-trial interval
(ITI) the rectangle disappeared, the computer choice would revert to the
circle with the interrogation mark, and a new trial started.
The trials for participants from Groups 1 (alone) and 3 (sharedperformance and feedback) were identical, and differed from those for Group 2
only in the type of auditory feedback they received. Upon making a choice
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participants of these conditions would also hear their choice (e.g., the word
“Rock”), and after three seconds they would hear the computer choice (e.g.,
“Paper”) followed by the sounds of applause, tie, or the thud tone as in the
other condition. In this way, while confederates in Group 2 would only hear
the tones of applause, tie, or the thud tone, those in Group 3 heard also
what the player’s and computer’s choices were.
The session consisted of four blocks of 60 trials each, for a total of
240 trials.2 At the end of each block the screen displayed the following
message: “Take a moment to rest and click on this message when you are ready
to continue.” At the end of the last trial of the last block they were shown
the message: “Thank you for your participation. Your score has been recorded
automatically. Please let the research assistant know that you are finished.”
Participants then were asked to complete a brief questionnaire asking for
some demographic information and whether they used any particular strategy or
game plan, and then were debriefed on the nature of the study and were
allowed to leave.
The computer’s responses were preprogrammed so that within each block
of 60 trials the computer chose each particular alternative with a different
probability. The order in which each block was presented was randomized by
the computer. For one block, the probability of the computer choosing each
alternative was the same (i.e., 33%). For the remaining three blocks the
probabilities for each alternative were 55%, 30%, and 15%, with each of the
three options being the most likely one in each of the blocks. We opted for
these rather moderate probabilities as we wanted to probe the effect of
shared attention in isolation from salient differences across blocks and also
because they were similar to those used in the Lie et al. (2013) study.

2

Lie, Baxter & Alsop (2013) presented their participants with significantly longer blocks
consisting of 126 trials. We first had 100 trials per block, but the sessions lasted about one
hour and a half, which we considered excessive.
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Probabilities were automatically calculated by the computer for each trial,
which meant that the actual number of trials only approximated the
preprogrammed probabilities (i.e., the actual number of trials of one type
was almost never exactly the same across all participants).
2.2 Results
The performance of participants will be analyzed separately into two
types of blocks. One type of blocks comprises those where the computer chose
any of the three alternatives with the same probability (i.e., .33;
hereafter, random blocks), while the other type comprises those blocks where
the computer chose one alternative with a higher probability (hereafter, nonrandom blocks). The task was programmed so that the order at which the random
block would appear would be random. Across blocks participants would be
expected to systematically select one alternative more than the others in
non-random blocks.
Importantly, insofar as the selection of one particular alternative
across a session might be reasonably inferred to depend not only on the
current block probabilities but also on choice during previous blocks, we
have considered that a multilevel modeling analysis might be the one most
suitable to detect significant differences, if any, across experimental
conditions. The participant sample size used in this first experiment (N =
42) is unfortunately too small and violates a number of assumptions of the
model, and hence a finer-graded statistical analysis was not possible.
Simpler analyses, like a chi-square test, are also affected by the fact that
responses across blocks are not uncorrelated, and hence no statistical data
about the differences across conditions will be provided in the analysis of
these data.
Figure 2.2 depicts the overall proportions of correct and incorrect
(i.e., losses and draws) responses for participants in the three experimental
conditions. As can be seen, and as expected, the proportion of correct
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responses in random blocks was around .33 across all three conditions. As for
non-random blocks, and also as expected, the number of correct attempts was
slightly higher across all three conditions, although in no case did the
proportion go above .4. Shared attention conditions seemed to obtain slightly
more correct responses than the Alone condition. Differences across groups in
these overall proportions are analyzed in more detail in Figures 2.3 and 2.4.
Figure 2.3 depicts the proportion of wins, losses, and draws across
blocks as the session progresses. As shown in the upper panel, although large
variability is observed in the proportions of each outcome depending on the
order at which the random block was presented, no systematic effect of block
order can be inferred. More interestingly, it might have been expected that
as participants gained experience with non-random blocks they might obtain
higher numbers of wins towards the end of the session. As the bottom panel of
Figure 3 shows, however, that doesn’t seem to be the case. While differences
seem to occur reliably across blocks, no linear trend can be inferred from
this performance.
Rather than looking at the outcomes across blocks, Figure 2.4 depicts
the proportion of each outcome across block portions. Since each block had 60
trials, each bar in Figure 2.4 represents an average of the first, second,
third, and fourth fifteen trials of all blocks. As observed, no systematic
trend is evident during random blocks (as should be expected), but in nonrandom blocks a slight trend is observed whereby wins were slightly more
likely to occur in the last two portions of each block. Although moderate,
these results suggest some adjustment to contingencies. Also importantly, no
large systematic differences were observed across shared attention
conditions.
Since this study closely followed the Lie et al. (2013) study, in
regard to the number of blocks and the probabilities tested, we decided to
analyze the present data in the same way as they did (see Figure 13 and
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Appendix I for a summary of matching law analysis). Namely, we obtained log
response ratios and log obtained reinforcer ratios for each possible pair of
alternatives (paper vs. scissors, paper vs. rock, and rock vs. scissors)
rather than by comparing the ratios of a single alternative to those of the
other two alternatives together. For example, the response ratio of paper vs.
scissors in the first block corresponded to the logarithm of the number of
“rock” responses in the first block divided by the number of “rock” and
“scissors” responses. Correspondingly, the obtained reinforcer ratio of paper
vs. scissors in the first block corresponds to the log number of reinforcers
(i.e., correct attempts) obtained when choosing “rock” in block one divided
by the number of reinforcers obtained by choosing both “rock” and scissors.”
Just like in the Lie et al. study, in those instances where
participants never selected one alternative in a whole block, the value of 0
(zero) was replaced by 0.25, so that the logarithm was calculable.
Furthermore, in their study they only calculated ratios for the last half of
trials of each block, so as to allow participants enough contact with the
programmed contingencies. We calculated the ratios for both the whole block
and the last half. Figures 2.5, 2.6 and 2.7, accordingly, depict the log
response ratios of each alternative as a function of the log programmed
reinforcement ratios for all trials (left panels) and for just the latter
half of trials (right panels) for each of the conditions. Figure 2.5 shows
the results for participants in the Alone condition, while Figures 2.6 and
2.7 show the results for participants in the shared attention conditions,
that is, the Shared-outcome-only and the Shared-performance-and-outcome
conditions, respectively.
As expected from the proportion data above described, matching was not
consistently observed across groups. The obtained R2 coefficients were
considerably smaller than those obtained in the Kangas et al. (2009) study
(where they were higher than .9 in all cases), and those in the most similar
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Lie et al. (2003) study (>.55 in almost all cases). In the current analysis,
these coefficients tended to increase when only the latter half of trials was
considered, particularly for the Shared-Outcome-only condition (Figure 2.6).
When analyzed this way, and considering only the last half of trials of each
block, it appears that participants from this condition outperformed those of
the other two conditions.
The sensitivity and bias parameters of the three conditions were
compared by doing an analysis of the covariance of the log reinforcer ratio
for each of the conditions. As could be inferred by visual inspection, no
significant differences were found for the Paper/Rock pair (F[2, 160] = .229,
p = .796), the Paper/Scissor pair (F[2, 160] = 1.67, p = .191), or the
Scissors/Rock pair (F[2, 160] = .920, p = .4), and no significant differences
were found across conditions in posthoc tests. The obtained sensitivity
parameters across groups are all inferior to 1, which indicates
undermatching, although they seem to be consistently, if lightly, higher for
participants from the Shared-Outcome-only condition, at least in the latter
half of each block (Figure 2.6). The bias parameters, instead, and across all
conditions are close to 0, which suggests little systematic bias for one
particular alternative across conditions.
The time it took participants to make a selection after the start of a
trial (hereafter called “response time”) is depicted in Figure 8. The
reaction time data was analyzed as a function of block, block type, and
finally block portion (the first, second, third, and fourth 16 trials of each
block). In all three analyses, participants from the Shared-Outcome-Only
condition had slightly but significantly longer response times. The
experimental condition affected reaction times, F(2, 9192) = 15.85, p < .01,
and a significant interaction was found between condition and block, F(6,
9192) = 6.312, p < .01. Post-hoc tests indicated that while the Alone and
Shared-Outcome-&-Performance conditions didn’t significantly differ (p =
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.56), the Shared-Outcome-Only differed significantly from both of the others
(p<.01). While reaction times tended to decrease for the Shared-Outcome-&Performance condition, and particularly for the Alone condition as the
session progressed, they tended to increase for those in the Shared-OutcomeOnly. When reaction times were analyzed within block portions (rightmost
panel in Figure 8) it is evident that while response times tended to decrease
as participants reached the end of a block of 60 trials, F(2, 9192) = 15.66,
p < .01, they actually increased for the Shared-Outcome-Only (p < .01).
Analysis of the participants’ strategies was conducted by following the
procedure developed by Dyson, Wilbiks, Sandhu et al. (2016). According to
these authors, a number of strategies can be observed when participants play
the game of rock-paper-scissors, broadly encompassed by the win-stay/loseshift strategy. Moreover, these authors have proposed that the shifting
strategy can be divided into two further types, which leads to a
categorization in terms of three cyclic strategies: (a) stay, consisting in
playing the same alternative as in the previous trial, (b) upgrading,
consisting in selecting the option that would have won in the previous trial,
and (c) downgrading, consisting in selecting the option that would have lost
in the previous trial.
Dyson and colleagues (2016) analyzed the responses of their
participants in two ways. First, they compared the use of each strategy
(i.e., stay, upgrade, and downgrade) as a function of the choice in the
previous trial (i.e., rock, paper, or scissors). Second, they compared the
use of each strategy as a function of the outcome of the previous trial
(i.e., win, lose, or draw). The same analysis was conducted here. Figure 9
depicts the strategy of participants as a function of the choice of the
previous trial for all participants. As can be seen, and unlike the
participants in Dyson et al. (2016), “staying” was overall the preferred
strategy, although important differences seem to emerge across groups.
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Participants from the Alone condition tended to have less preference for a
single strategy, although they tended to stay after choosing paper. In the
Shared-Outcome-only condition, participants tended to stay following every
choice. Finally, participants from the Shared-Outcome-&-Performance condition
tended to keep playing Rock if that was the previous choice, and to downgrade
and stay following paper. Although lacking a statistical analysis, visual
inspection suggests that the shared attention conditions tended to produce
the more variability in overall strategy.
Figure 2.10 depicts the participants’ strategy as a function of the
outcome (win, draw, or loss) of their last choice for random and non-random
blocks. Unlike the results of Dyson and colleagues, and unexpectedly, “stay”
remained a common strategy following losses and draws across all conditions.
As expected, and just like in the study by Dyson, a win/stay strategy is
quite common, but appears to be more marked in the current study.
Interestingly, the tendency to stay following a win seemed to have increased
in the shared attention conditions in non-random blocks. Losses seemed to
affect differentially the strategy of participants compared to draws. In both
random and non-random blocks, losses tended to lead to “downgrading” across
all conditions. Participants didn’t seem to prefer a particular strategy
following a draw in the random blocks, but unexpectedly tended to “stay” in
non-random blocks only for the shared attention conditions.
Figure 2.11 depicts the changes (or lack thereof) in strategy as a
function of the outcome of the previous response across blocks only for nonrandom blocks. As can be seen, for all conditions, a win/stay strategy
becomes more prevalent as the session progresses. It’s also noticeable that
staying becomes progressively more common following losses and particularly
draws in both of the shared attention conditions. While this progressive
preference for staying might be attributed to fatigue, it seems unlikely in
the face of the fact that it seemed to affect mostly those participants in
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the shared attention conditions, and in that it seemed to be more common
following draws than losses.
Changes in strategy across block portions are depicted in Figure 12. As
can be observed, the win-stay strategy also seems to become more favored as
blocks are coming to an end. Otherwise, strategies remain relatively stable,
although an increase in staying is also evident following draws only in the
Shared-Outcome-only condition. As can be seen, the unexpected preference for
staying following draws in both shared attention conditions appears to occur
early within blocks.
2.3 Discussion
Undermatching was quite evident across all conditions in this pilot
study. Participants failed to “track” the programmed reinforcer rates,
regardless of the experimental manipulations, although matching seemed to
increase in the Shared-Outcome-Only condition, albeit only when the latter
half of trials across blocks are taken into account. In contrast, the shared
attention manipulations had important although relatively unsystematic
effects in response times and particularly in the strategy used by
participants, but these effects were not generally reflected in matching the
reinforcer rates. One important consideration derived from the analysis of
strategy, and one that might be problematic for a matching analysis, is that
draws and losses seemed to affect differentially the strategy of
participants, and that this effect appears to be somewhat stronger in shared
attention conditions.
One possible reason for these negative results is of a technical
nature. The way the experiment was programmed, the probabilities that the
computer would select a particular alternative were determined trial by
trial. That is, at the start of each trial, and depending on the block, the
computer selected an alternative with the programmed probability (e.g., rock:
55%, paper: 30%, scissors: 15%). Since the computer made such determination
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with each trial, this means that the actual proportion that an alternative
was chosen by the computer across a block differed across participants, and
only approached the programmed probabilities. As a consequence the actual
differences in probability for each alternative might have been artificially
reduced for some participants, which might have blurred the differences in
such proportions across blocks.
In addition, and as compared to the previous studies, the current study
comprised a significantly lower number of trials (Four blocks of 60 trials
each, versus ten blocks of 100 trials in the Kangas et al, 2009 study, and
four blocks of 126 trials in the Lie et al., 2013 study). As mentioned above,
we decided to reduce the number of trials because session times were
exceeding one hour and a half, which we considered excessive. It seems
reasonable that the technical issues in determining the probabilities (which
might have made the differences across blocks less salient), combined with
the reduced number of trials, might have prevented participants from making
enough contact with the programmed contingencies. These considerations were
addressed in the design of Experiment 2.
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3. Experiment 2
Elucidating Shared Attention Effects
The previous experiment involved a shorter version of the task used by
Lie et al. (2013) to attempt to determine whether social influences like
shared attention play a role in the adjustment to changing contingencies. As
discussed, although the social manipulation played some role in the strategy
used by participants, regardless of the social manipulation participants in
the previous experiment undermatched the programmed contingencies to an even
larger extent than participants in the Lie et al. study, with sensitivity
parameters ranging between 0.2 and 0.47 (versus 0.54-0.66 in the equivalent
condition in the Lie et al. experiment).
One of the issues in the analysis of these results is related to the
programmed probabilities across blocks that were selected. As described
above, we chose block probabilities that were similar to those used by Lie et
al., where one option was only slightly more probable than the others.
Moreover, because of the way the computer program determined said probability
the actual likelihood of one option being correct might have been lower than
anticipated, which might suggest that the differences in the probability of
each choice were so small that participants might have been unable to detect
them, and hence responded randomly regardless of the changes in
probabilities. In other words, since the differences in probabilities were
relatively small, choosing at random on each trial was a good enough
strategy.
As also pointed out by Lie et al. (2013), the original study by Kangas
et al. (2009) involved more extreme ranges of programmed probabilities,
including blocks where a choice would be correct up to 85% of the time. With
increased experience of these larger differences in probability it might be
anticipated that participants would respond more sensitively to the changes
in contingencies across blocks. If so, it would be of interest to determine
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whether early contact with largely discrepant proportions affects sensitivity
more than later contact, and whether the presence of a co-attending
confederate would play any positive or negative role in the adjustment to
changing contingencies in this task. Accordingly, we modified our
experimental task so that instead of having three blocks with the same
programmed probabilities, participants experienced blocks with progressively
larger discrepancies.
3.1 Method
3.1.1 Design
To further tease out these differences we decided to present these
probabilities in two sequences: one sequence where block probabilities become
more discrepant across blocks, and another one where probabilities start
largely discrepant and become progressively less discriminable. As the
discrepancy in probability is increased, participants should be expected to
obtain correspondingly higher proportions of correct attempts. In light of
the effects of the social conditions in the previous experiment, we decided
to explore the effect of these changing probabilities using the same
manipulation of shared attention as in the previous experiment. Hence, the
second experiment involved a 3 x 2 design, wherein participants from the
Solo, Shared-Outcome-only, and Shared-Outcome-&-Feedback conditions were
presented with a sequence of either progressively more or progressively less
discriminable response probabilities (see Table 3.1).
In the first sequence condition, the participants started with a block
where the probabilities of each response being correct were the same, with
each successive block having one alternative being progressively more likely.
Participants of this “Hard-to-Easy” condition, hence, had a first block with
a (0.33 – 0.33 – 0.33) probability, a second block with a (0.4 – 0.3 – 0.3)
probability, a third block with a (0.6 – 0.2 – 0.2) probability, and a final
block with a (0.8 – 0.1 – 0.1) probability. Participants from the second
28

condition, were exposed to the opposite sequence (“Easy-to-Hard”), that is,
their first block was the one with the most extreme probabilities (0.8 – 0.1
– 0.1) and their final block was the one with the least extreme probabilities
(0.33 – 0.33 – 0.33). As in the previous experiment, the computer determined
pseudo-randomly which alternative is the most likely for each block, such
that each option was the most likely for just one of the blocks.
Also, because of the way the computer choices were preprogrammed in the
previous experiment, the actual number of trials of each type only approached
the preselected probabilities. In consequence, in this second experiment we
decided to control this by making sure that during each block the number of
trials of each type will be kept constant across participants. In this
manner, for instance, for the block with (0.6 – 0.2 – 0.2) probabilities, 36
out of the 60 trials were of one choice, while the computer chose each of the
other alternatives for 12 trials each.
Other than these changes in the sequence and value of the probabilities
and in the distribution of trials within each block, the experimental task
was identical to that of the first experiment.
3.1.2 Participants
168 undergraduate students participated in the study. They were
randomly assigned to one of the three experimental conditions. Data from two
of the participants were excluded from the analysis because of errors in the
experimental session. The final data analysis included 166 participants, with
58 in the Solo condition (female N = 29, mean age = 18.74 years, sd =2.59),
59 in the Shared-Outcome-Only condition (female N = 32, mean age = 18.78
years, sd =0.97), and 49 in the Shared-Outcome-&-Performance condition
(female N = 25, mean age = 18.84 years, sd =0.87). 84 participants were in
the “Easy-to-Hard” condition, while 82 were in the “Hard-to-Easy” condition.
Participants received academic credit for participating in the experiment.
3.1.3 Apparatus and Setting
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The experimental sessions were conducted in the same setting and with
the same apparatus as in Experiment 1. Sessions lasted about 45 minutes.
3.1.4 Procedure
The procedure was identical to that of Experiment 1. Participants of
Groups 2 (Shared-Outcome-only) and 3 (Shared-Outcome-&-Feedback) sat next to
an undergraduate confederate who acted as an unknowing participant. All
participants were presented with the same creativity task as in the previous
experiment, with participants from Groups 2 and 3 completing it by
collaborating with the confederates. Then, the participant (and confederates)
was led to the cubicle, with confederates standing behind the participant.
The same general instructions as in the previous experiment were read to the
participant and presented in the screen, and following the five practice
trials they were told that they could start whenever they wanted, while
confederates sat down in an adjacent cubicle.
The trial configuration was identical to that of the previous
experiment, and like that one, the type of auditory feedback that
participants received after making a choice depended on the experimental
condition: participants from Group 2 (Shared-Outcome-only) received auditory
feedback for the outcome of their choice (applauses, “tie”, or a “thunk” tone
corresponding to wins, draws, and losses, respectively), while participants
from Groups 1 (Solo) and 3 (Shared-Performance and Feedback) received
auditory feedback for both their and the computer’s choice (the words “Rock,”
“Paper,” or “Scissors” according to their choice), as well as about the
outcome of their choice (applauses, “tie”, or a “thunk” tone). Thus, as in
the previous experiment, while confederates in Group 2 would only hear the
tones of applause, tie, or the thud tone, those in Group 3 heard also what
the player’s and computer’s choices were.
Like the previous experiment the session consisted of four blocks of 60
trials each, for a total of 240 trials. The intertrial and interblock
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intervals were the same as in the previous experiments, as well as the
messages participants received between blocks and at the end of the session,
and were asked to complete the brief survey about demographic information and
whether they used any particular strategy or game plan, and then were
debriefed on the nature of the study and were allowed to leave.
Participants also completed a brief self-report survey (see Appendix)
that inquired about their own perception of different aspects of the task and
their performance, and particularly about their interaction with the
confederate in the case of the shared attention conditions. The survey
consisted of 11 Likert-scale items that could be rated from 1 (Not all) to 7
(Very much). To rate this survey, items 4 through 6 were averaged under the
label of “Partner Liking,” while items 7 through 11 were averaged under the
label of “Perceived closeness to partner.”
3.2 Results
Insofar as the main dependent variables for the collected data on both
the performance and strategy of participants were the proportions of outcomes
(i.e., wins, draws, and losses) or the proportion of trials using a
particular strategy (i.e., staying, upgrading, or downgrading), and these are
categorical variables, and violate a number of the assumptions of the general
linear model (GLM), the statistical analysis of these data demands a
different approach. Moreover, since the proportions of each of these
variables across blocks are likely correlated (as they correspond to
responses by the same individual in time), the most appropriate model for
analysis is the Generalized Estimating Equations or GEE model with an
autoregressive working correlation structure, which allows for weaker
correlations among data points farther away in time. All of the subsequent
statistical analyses were obtained by using this model, and the significance
of differences tested by conducting Wald Chi-squared tests.
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Figure 3.1 shows the overall mean proportion of wins, draws, and losses
for participants of each social and sequence condition. As can be observed,
in general participants didn’t differ significantly in the proportion of wins
as a function of social condition, Wald χ2(2, N = 39,840) = 1.129, p=.569,
with the overall proportion ranging between 0.38 and 0.40 across all
conditions. The sequence of probabilities, instead, did affect the mean
proportion of wins, with participants in the “Easy-to-Hard” sequence
obtaining slightly more wins (39.6%) across all social conditions compared to
those in the “Hard-to-Easy” condition (37.8%), Wald χ2 (1, N = 39,840) =
6.963, p<.05. No interaction was found between the social and sequence
conditions, χ2 (2, N = 39,840) = 0.981, p= .612.
The two sequences affected differentially the proportion of wins across
blocks for all social conditions, χ2 (3, N = 39,840) = 381.1, p< 0.001. In
particular, for participants in the “Hard-to-Easy” condition, the proportion
of wins didn’t increase progressively across blocks (Figure 3.2) as was
expected, but instead remained relatively stable for the three first blocks
and then increased abruptly in the final block. It should also be noticed
that out of the three conditions, participants in the Shared-Outcome-only one
showed the more progressive increase of wins. In contrast, in the “Easy-toHard” conditions the proportion of wins tended to decrease progressively as
blocks became harder to discriminate, as would be expected of behavior that
is sensitive to the changing contingencies. Also, participants in the Solo
condition obtained the highest proportion of wins, but only in the Easy-toHard condition.
Within blocks the proportion of wins changed across block portions,
with more wins overall in the last half of the trials (see Figure 3.3), Wald
χ2 (3, N = 39,840) = 419.997, p<.001. No significant interaction was found
between block portion and either social condition, χ2 (6, N = 39,840) = 4.157,
p=.655, or sequence condition, χ2 (3, N = 39,840) = 3.873, p=.276.
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Figures 3.10 through 3.11 depict the log response ratios as a function
of the log reinforcement ratios for pairs of choices (i.e., rock vs. paper,
rock vs. scissors, and paper vs. scissors) for all participants for the three
social conditions. As was the case in the previous experiment, across all
social and sequence conditions the participants’ pattern of choice was one of
undermatching (sensitivity, s < 1). Bias didn’t occur systematically across
conditions (see Table 3.2). The sensitivity parameters tended to be larger
for participants in the “Easy to Hard” sequence conditions, with the
exception of participants in the Shared Outcome & Feedback condition, whose
parameters were very similar for both sequence conditions. This increased
sensitivity in “Easy to Hard” sequences appeared to be enhanced in the Solo
condition. Since the GLM delivered such low accounted variance estimates
(ranging between

1.8% and 42.3%), however, these differences across

conditions need to be taken with care, particularly when considered together
with the lack of overall differences in the proportion of correct attempts
across conditions that we reviewed above.
Since the probabilities of the program choosing each option were
systematically manipulated across blocks it could be argued that certain
strategies would be most optimal depending on the particular block
probabilities. Namely, it could be argued that in those blocks in which the
computer chose each option with equal probability the optimal strategy for
participants would be to switch their choice often. As the differences in
probability become larger, the optimal strategy would be sticking with one
option progressively more. Accordingly, “Staying” was the most common
strategy across all social and sequence conditions (Figure 3.4). Although
participants from the Solo condition tended to stay more overall (41.5%) than
participants from the shared attention conditions (38.0% and 37.8%, for
conditions 2 and 3, respectively), this effect was not significant, Wald χ2
(3, N = 39,176) = 2.548, p=.28. In contrast, and as occurred in the case of
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the proportion of total wins, the sequence of presentation did have a
significant effect, (1, N = 39,176) = 12.224, p<.001, with participants in
the “Easy-to-Hard” conditions staying for 43% of the trials versus 35% in the
“Hard-to-Easy” conditions. No interaction was found between sequence and
social condition.
The proportion of Staying as the preferred strategy varied as a
function of the block, as expected, Wald χ2 (3, N = 39,176) = 47.337, p<.001.
Furthermore, this effect was moderated by the sequence of presentation, Wald
χ2 (3, N = 39,176) = 112.736, p<.001 (see Figure 3.5). Across social
conditions, participants in the “Hard-to-Easy” conditions didn’t vary their
relatively inefficient strategy across the first three blocks and only
switched to Staying abruptly by the fourth block. In contrast, participants
in the “Easy-to-Hard” conditions tended to opt for Staying gradually less and
less, as would be expected of a better contact with the programmed
probabilities. As could be inferred from Figure 3.5, the presence or absence
of a coattending confederate didn’t appear to play a role, Wald χ2 (2, N =
39,176) = 2.514, p=.285. No interaction between social and sequence
conditions was found, although participants in the Solo condition tended to
opt for Staying (56% of trials) more than participants in the Shared
Attention conditions (46% and 42%, respectively) in the Easy-to-Hard
sequence, and tended to do so across blocks. Overall, and regardless of
social and sequence conditions, Staying tended to become progressively more
frequent throughout block portions, Wald χ2 (3, N = 39,176) = 48.043, p=<.001
(see Figure 3.6).
The participants’ strategy was affected by the outcome of the previous
trial, χ2 (2, N = 39,176) = 162.279, p=<.001 (Figure 3.7). Overall,
participants tended to stay more following wins (45.6% of trials), and to
switch (upgrading or downgrading) following draws and losses. Furthermore,
across social and sequence conditions, stays were slightly more frequent
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following draws than when they followed losses. Overall, the strategy of
participants as a function of the outcome of the previous trial was the same
regardless of the social manipulation of shared attention (see Figure 3.8).
In contrast, an effect of sequence was found, with stays after wins being
much more frequent in the Easy-to-Hard conditions (about 62% of trials) than
in Hard-to-Easy conditions (about 42% of trials, see Figure 3.8).
These results are much more evident when analyzed through blocks
(Figure 3.9). Since the optimal strategy for those blocks with the larger
discrepancies among probabilities (i.e., the 0.8 – 0.1 – 0.1 blocks) is
staying, it’s not surprising that participants chose staying preferentially
in those blocks following wins. In the case of participants in the Easy-toHard conditions, who experienced first this type of blocks, staying remained
the most common strategy across blocks following wins and decreased only
slightly even in the more “ambiguous” blocks. In contrast, when participants
first experienced the progressively easier conditions the rate of wins
following stays remained low and increased only in the final, easiest, block.
This was true regardless of the social condition. Following draws and loses,
across blocks participants preferred switching (i.e., upgrading or
downgrading) than staying. Interestingly, the rate of staying was slightly
but reliably higher following draws than losses, which suggests that, indeed,
they affect participants differentially, regardless of the social condition.
3.2.1 Self-Report Data
As can be observed (Table 3.3), overall and across conditions
participants described the task as not difficult (ranging between 1.73 and
1.86), and relatively enjoyable (ranging between 3.24 and 4.05), and
participants were relatively satisfied with their performance. Interestingly,
this self-reported satisfaction with performance correlated with the total of
wins only for the Solo conditions, r(46)=.301, p<.05, two-tailed, while in
the Shared Attention conditions the satisfaction with their performance
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correlated instead with the total losses, r(56)= -.498, p<.001, for the
Shared Outcome Only condition, and r(46)= -.341, p<.05, for the Shared
Outcome & Feedback condition. In regard to closeness to the liking and
feelings of closeness with partner, they didn’t appear to correlate
significantly with either the strategy or overall outcomes of participants,
although a small negative correlation appeared between closeness and total
wins, only for the Shared Outcome Only condition, r(56)= -.273, p<.05.
3.3 Discussion
Compared to the previous experiment, participants obtained only
slightly more correct attempts and then mostly on those blocks where the
programmed probabilities of the computer’s choices were the most discrepant.
Overall, the social manipulation of shared attention by a coattending
confederate didn’t have any significant effect in the outcome, although
participants in the Solo condition did slightly better in the most discrepant
block when it was presented first. Participants across all social and
attention conditions undermatched the programmed reinforcer probabilities,
although undermatching was slightly less frequent in the “Easy to hard”
sequence conditions.
The social manipulation didn’t appear to systematically affect the
participant’s strategy as a function of either the previous choice or its
outcome, although again, those in the Solo condition tended to opt for
staying as a preferred strategy, only when the sequence of block presentation
was Easy-to-Hard. This experiment is unique in that the different
probabilities were deliberately presented in progressively decreasing or
increasing order. Although this introduces the complicated issue of order
effects, we did find that the sequence of presentation was a major predictor
of both performance and, particularly, strategy in this brief three-choice
task. Experiencing “hard” blocks, that is, those where each option was as
probable as the others had deleterious effects on the strategy of
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participants in the subsequent blocks. The fact that these participants only
changed their strategy in the final, most discriminable block suggests that
their responding was less sensitive than that of participants who experienced
the easiest block first and whose strategy changed gradually in
correspondence with the decreased probability of one response being the most
frequently correct one for a particular block.
Rodriguez and Logue (1986) reported relatively similar effects of order
of presentation in a study with pigeons, showing bias towards alternatives
that were initially preferred as they become progressively less beneficial
(i.e., as their magnitude of reinforcement decreases and their delays to
reinforcement increase), but to the best of our knowledge, no published study
has presented the varying probabilities in this particular ascending or
descending order. This is probably a result of the differences in the
experimental study of choice when conducted in humans versus other species,
where subjects have daily sessions extending for weeks. Human participants,
instead, and for a variety of reasons, generally participate in very few or
most commonly a single experimental session. In the traditional nonhuman
animal preparation for choice behavior, the varying probabilities or rates of
reinforcement associated with different choices are presented only once per
experimental session. It might well be, of course, that with extended
experimental sessions the behavior of human participants might resemble more
that of other species (cf. Madden, Chase & Joyce, 1998), but insofar as
ethical, practical or monetary issues make this possibility largely
unrealistic this “insensitivity” effect occurring as a result of withinsession presentation order needs to be considered in studies of choice
behavior involving human participants.
There is at least another possibility. As will be discussed in more
detail in the next chapter, appropriate levels of matching are obtained
occasionally with human participants in concurrent choice procedures
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relatively similar to this one (e.g., Kangas et al., 2003), but in many other
circumstances deviations from optimal matching are frequent, unless precise
verbal descriptions of the contingencies are provided to participants (e.g,
Takahashi & Shimakura, 1998). Due to their presumably large history playing
the Rock-Paper-Scissors game, participants are likely to infer that their
opponent (the computer, in this case) is adapting its strategy throughout the
session in response to the participant’s strategy. In other words,
participants might be inferring more complicated patterns of strategy than
the computer is actually using (that is, choosing one option preferentially),
and are hence being “too smart for their own good,” as Arkes and Ayton (1999)
suggest happens in other research on suboptimal choice (e.g., the sunk-cost
effect). The participant’s inferences about the contingencies would then work
as self-provided instructions for their further responding, and might hinder
control by experimental contingencies. If so, this might explain the
discrepancies in strategy following wins when the more discriminable sequence
is presented first versus when it’s presented last. Participants might assume
the computer is actually adapting to their own choices, particularly in the
truly random blocks, and hence assume that no strategy will be optimal. When
participants experience the easier block first, instead, they appear to
become slightly more sensitive to the computer’s strategy.
With the technical and procedural modifications made in this experiment
as compared to the first one, the effects of the presence of a coattending
confederate on participants’ performance and strategy became even less
obvious. If anything, shared attention seemed to only affect (and negatively)
performance in the easiest, most discriminable of blocks, with participants
in the Easy-to-Hard condition who did the task alone obtaining more correct
attempts in the first block than those participants in the corresponding
shared attention conditions. This resulted in a slightly larger, albeit nonsignificant, proportion of wins overall for this condition.
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4. Experiment 3
Exploring the Effects of Verbal Instructions
As reviewed in the first chapter, in the tradition of the experimental
analysis of human behavior, the study of rigidity in human responding to
programmed experimental contingencies involving schedules of reinforcement
has been centered on the role of verbal experimental instructions provided to
participants. As mentioned there, verbal instructions can be seen as somewhat
of a double-edge sword. On the one hand, they appear to bypass the need for
extensive training in the establishing of behavioral repertoires, an aspect
that has practical implications for example in the reduction of the number
and duration of experimental sessions, or in the duration and efficacy of
applied interventions. Verbal instructions, of course, are a very important
aspect of teaching, a cooperative communication strategy that appears to be
particularly characteristic of human cultures, and has been suggested as a
critical factor in the so-called “ratchet effect,” a term used to refer to
the cumulative character of human culture (Tomasello, 2011).
By the other hand, and as reviewed in the first chapter, verbal
instructions might on occasion hinder effective control by experimental
contingencies, a phenomenon that is often called “insensitivity to
contingencies.” To the best of our knowledge, only a handful of studies
involving instructional manipulations with human participants has been
conducted using a choice paradigm. In one of these paradigms participants
have to choose between two schedules of reinforcement with one of the
schedules yielding progressively lower rates of reinforcement (a progressivetime or PT schedule of reinforcement), and participants are given relatively
accurate or inaccurate description of these changes (Fox & Pietras, 2013; Fox
& Kyonka, 2017; Hackenberg & Joker, 1994), all of them showing insensitivity
as a function of the presentation of accurate instructions first. A second
procedure involved a self-control task where participants could choose
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between an option that provided reinforcers immediately but kept increasing
the delays of future choices or one that provided reinforcers about a
specific delay (Kudadjie-Gyamfi & Rachlin, 2002). Participants in this study
were given an accurate instruction, which increased their choice of the
“self-control” key.
Finally, in a more traditional concurrent choice paradigm, a few
studies involved some direct manipulation of verbal instructions, consisting
generally of a brief, vague description of the contingencies, (e.g, Horne &
Lowe, 1993). Takahashi and Shimakura (1998) had participants press two levers
according to two different concurrent variable interval (VI) schedules, and
provided them with instructions that described either the time contingency or
the reinforcement rate associated with each lever for each VI value, or both.
They found that the matching law described very accurately the pattern of
responding of participants, but only when they received instructions
describing the frequency of behavior.
Kangas, Berry, Cassidy and colleagues (2009), using the rock-paperscissors procedure herein used, conducted an experiment where participants
were given accurate verbal instructions at the start of each of their ten
100-trials blocks. These accurate instructions resulted in overmatching, that
is, “excessive” preference for the choice described as being the most
probable. Considering the failure of our shared attention conditions in
affecting systematically the participants’ tracking of the programmed
probabilities across blocks, it seems worth exploring whether providing
instructions to participants might moderate the effect of the presence of a
co-attending confederate on the performance and strategy of participants.
Moreover, to the best of our knowledge, no studies of choice in humans
have involved the use of inaccurate instructions. In all reviewed literature
in this area (cf. Takahashi & Shikamura, 1998), instructions have been at
worst vague. As a first exploration of this issue in the context of our
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paradigm, we decided to expose participants to a modified version of our
original task, involving the presentation of accurate and inaccurate
instructions, when completing the task by themselves or in the presence of a
second, coattending participant.
4.1 Method
4.1.1. Design
Major modifications on our original paradigm were done in this
experiment. First, since our interest in this experiment was mostly on the
role of verbal instructions, we decided to have only two social conditions: a
Solo condition and a Shared Instruction condition. Moreover, unlike our two
previous experiments, this one didn’t involve a confederate, and instead
participants attempting the task either by themselves or with another
participant.
More importantly, participants in the Shared Instruction condition were
informed, accurately, that the computer program would be the same for both of
them, and that in consequence it would be playing the same strategy against
both of them. Because adding auditory performance feedback might instead
prove a distracting factor with participants playing simultaneously, and to
better isolate shared attention on instructions only, unlike the two previous
experiments participants didn’t receive any auditory feedback on their
performance.
Two further major modifications on the original task were conducted.
First, we wanted to increase the number of trials of each block to make them
more similar to those used in the Kangas et al. (2009) and Lie et al. (2013)
studies. Also, and in line with the second experiment of Kangas et al.
(2009), we provided an instruction at the start of each of the blocks. As a
consequence, and because we wanted to explore the utility of this paradigm to
study instructional control, we decided to reduce the number of blocks.
Participants were hence presented with three blocks. First, a control block
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which had only 40 trials, and in which the computer played each choice with
the same probability (i.e., 0.33, 033, and 0.33). Second, an Accurate
Instructions block where participants received an accurate instruction at the
start of a block of 100 trials. Finally, an Inaccurate Instructions block,
with an inaccurate instruction at the start, consisting of 100 trials.
4.1.2 Participants
110 undergraduate students (46 females; mean age = 19.32 years, sd =
1.209) participated in this experiment, randomly assigned to each of the two
experimental conditions. 43 participants were in the Solo condition, while 67
were in the Shared Attention condition. Participants received academic credit
for participating in the experiment.
4.1.3 Apparatus and Setting
The experimental sessions were conducted in the same setting and with
the same apparatus as in the two previous experiments. Sessions lasted about
45 minutes.
4.1.4 Procedure
Like in the two previous experiments, participants from both conditions
were asked to complete a creativity task at the start of the experimental
session, with participants of the Shared Instruction condition being urged to
complete the task collaboratively. Following the completion of this task,
participants were seated in an experimental cubicle, with those in the Shared
Instruction condition sitting in adjacent cubicles. The cubicles prevented
visual contact with the other participant’s performance. All participants
were asked to enter their subject number and click on a button reading
“Condition 1.” The goal of this was that participants in the Shared
Instruction condition were aware that they were playing the same task as the
other participant next to them.
General instructions were then read to all participants. These general
instructions were almost identical to those used in the previous experiments:
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“You will be playing a game of ‘Rock-Paper-Scissors’ against the
computer. The rules are the usual ones:

Rock beats Scissors, but loses

against Paper; Paper beats Rock, but loses against Scissors; and Scissors
beats Paper, but loses against Rock.

If you don’t know how to play this

game, please ask the experimenter to explain. You will make your selection by
clicking the mouse cursor on the option you choose. The computer will make
its selection at the exact same time you do. The winner of each round will
receive one point, and the loser will receive 0 points. If there is a tie,
the score will remain unchanged. Your task is to obtain as many points as you
can, so try and respond in the way that would make you get the most points.”
Participants in the Solo condition were also presented with the
following sentences to encourage them to perform better and to try to figure
out the computer’s strategy:
“To encourage you to do your best, we will donate some money to a
charity depending on who obtains the most points. We’ll provide you with a
list of charities at the end of experiment, so, the higher your score, the
higher the chances we’ll donate to that particular charity. Also, notice that
the computer tends to stick to a particular strategy across the game,
generally choosing one option slightly more often than the others. We
encourage you to try to figure out what that strategy is. Do you have any
questions?”
For participants in the Shared Attention condition the instructions
emphasized shared attention and were aimed to induce a more collaborative
approach:
“To encourage you to do your best, we will donate some money to a
charity depending on how well both of you perform. At the end of the
experiment we will combine both of your scores. We’ll provide both of you
with a list of charities at the end of experiment so that the higher your
combined score is, the higher the chances we’ll donate to that particular
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charity. Also, notice that the computer tends to stick to a particular
strategy across the game, generally choosing one option slightly more often
than the others. The computer will at all times play with exactly the same
strategy against both of you. We encourage you to try to figure out what that
strategy is. Do you have any questions?”
The trial configuration was identical to that of the previous
experiments with the difference that no auditory feedback was provided for
either choice or outcome for any of the participants.
The session consisted of three blocks, the first of 40 trials, and the
remaining two of 100 trials each, for a total of 240 trials. Following
completion of the first trial participants were presented with the following
message in the screen:
"From now on, the computer will be programmed to play Rock ___% of the
time, Paper ___% of the time, and Scissors ___% of the time. Click the
'Continue' button when you're ready to continue."
These were the same instructions provided in the experiment by Kangas
and colleagues (2009). In the case of the instructions for the second block,
the actual, corresponding probabilities of the computer choosing each option
were provided. For the third block, the same message appeared but the
depicted proportions described inaccurately the programmed contingencies.
To better tease out the effects of these instructions, we opted for
intermediate probabilities. For both of these blocks, then, the computer
chose one option slightly more often than the other two (.55, .15, .30,
respectively). The computer determined randomly which option would be the
most frequent, and it was always a different one of the second and third
blocks.
After the last trial was completed, participants received a message
informing them of the end of the session, and were asked to complete the
brief survey about demographic information and whether they used any
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particular strategy or game plan. In addition, and so as to determine whether
any personality factors might be predictive of rigidity in the participants’
strategy, they completed a brief personality inventory, the Ten Item
Personality Inventory (TIPI; Gosling, Rentfrow & Swann, 2003). They also
completed a form indicating to which charity they would prefer money was
donated. They were then were debriefed on the nature of the study and were
allowed to leave.
4.2 Results
Since this Experiment included only three blocks, and one of them with
significantly less trials (40) than the other two (100 each), a matching
analysis is precluded in the present experiment. Moreover, since the first
block was briefer, data from the last two blocks was emphasized in the
analysis.
The overall mean proportion of wins, draws, and losses for participants
of both conditions is presented in Figure 4.1, which are slightly higher than
those for participants in the previous experiment. Although participants in
the Solo condition obtained slightly more wins, this difference was not
significant, χ2(1, N = 26,400) = .956, p=.328. Figure 4.2 shows the
proportions of each outcome for both conditions across blocks. As in the
previous experiment, a GEE model with an autoregressive working correlation
structure was used to analyze these differences in the performance of
participants across blocks. The proportion of wins changed as a function of
the instructional manipulations, Wald χ2(2, N = 26,400) = 129.835, p<.001, but
the effects of introducing instructions didn’t change as a function of the
social condition, χ2(2, N = 26,400) =1.000, p=.607.
As can be observed, for both conditions the introduction of accurate
instructions increased the proportion of wins (see Figure 4.2). It must be
remembered, though, that the first block consisted of merely 40 trials as
compared to 100 trials for the other two blocks. Nonetheless, the proportion
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of wins for both conditions was above 40%, which is slightly higher than
those in the intermediate blocks of the previous experiment. A GEE analysis
excluding the trials in the first block indicates, importantly, that
performance deteriorated slightly but significantly with the introduction of
inaccurate instructions (that is, in the third block), Wald χ2(1, N = 22,000)
= 22.062, p<.001. Once again, no main effect or interaction was obtained as a
function of the social condition.
The effect of the introduction of verbal descriptions of the
experimental probabilities is clearer when the strategy of participants was
observed. As can be seen, and unlike the previous experiments, the
presentation of verbal instructions induced a marked preference for Staying
versus the other two strategies, χ2(2, N = 26,070) = 224.234, p<.001.
Moreover, when considering only the instruction blocks, participants tended
to Stay slightly more in the block with inaccurate instructions, Wald χ2(1, N
= 21,780) = 3.967, p=0.046. Once again, no significant main effect or
interaction of the social manipulation was obtained.
As can be observed in the accompanying Figure 4.5, and as expected,
following wins participants tended overall to stay. Moreover, the proportion
of trials for which staying followed wins was comparable to that of the
blocks with the most extreme differences in reinforcement rate in the
previous experiment. Interestingly, this proportion was also larger for the
block with inaccurate instructions, χ2(1, N = 9,201) = 6.500, p<0.05 (Figure
4.6). The data were further analyzed in successive block portions of ten
trials. When analyzed this way, as can be seen, while both conditions had
similar rates of correct attempts, the social attention condition tended to
produce less variable rates within block (Figure 7). Moreover, as shown in
Figure 4.8, the difference lied in that staying became progressively more
common in the Accurate instructions block, while it started at a high level
in the Inaccurate instructions block regardless of the social condition
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manipulation. The difference in these sequences was significant, χ2(18, N =
9,201) = 100.786, p<.001.
Also, and unlike the previous experiment, staying remained the
preferred strategy following both draws and losses for participants in both
conditions (Figure 4.9). As can be seen, the effect was more pronounced with
draws, suggesting again that they might affect participants differently than
losses.
4.2.1 Self-Report Data
Participants rated the difficulty of the task as low (M = 1.96), with
moderate enjoyment and moderate satisfaction with their performance. Those in
the shared attention condition also reported moderate liking of the other
participant and relatively low levels of closeness to them. The reported
difficulty of the task didn’t correlate significantly with the outcomes of
performance (see Table 4.1), while some moderate correlations were found
between difficulty and the participant’s strategy as a function of the
previous choice: the more participants “stayed” the lower the difficulty
rating, r = -2.6, p<.001, two-tailed. Unlike the previous experiment,
enjoyment of the task didn’t correlate significantly with the outcomes of the
task, which can be attributed to the fact that no auditory feedback was
provided on performance in this experiment. A couple of small correlations
were found between these self-reported items and the scores for the brief
personality inventory, with enjoyment of the task and satisfaction with the
performance correlating positively with “emotional stability,” and enjoyment
correlating negatively with openness to experience. Although Schultz and
Searleman (2002) had suggested that Openness to Experience should be most
related to behavioral rigidity, no significant correlations were found
between scores in any of the personality items and the participants’
performance or strategy.

47

4.3 Discussion
The introduction of verbal descriptions of the programmed contingencies
appeared to produce a number of effects on the participants’ performance and
strategy in blocks where the computer chose a particular response slightly
more than the others. This experiment included only two of these blocks,
which in addition had a larger number of trials than those in the previous
experiments. It also included a different shared attention condition:
participants who completed the task simultaneously to a second participant
were informed that the computer would be playing the same task and the
computer would choose the same strategy against both of them. As described in
a previous section, they were also told that their scores would be combined,
so as to encourage engagement with the task. Overall, however, and just like
in the previous experiments, the manipulation of shared attention didn’t
produce noticeable effects on either performance or strategy.
Verbal instructions generally had a beneficial effect on the
participants’ performance, with participants obtaining larger proportions of
correct attempts than participants in blocks with comparable proportions in
the previous two experiments. These results were probably a consequence of
participants in this experiment opting for “staying” as the preferred
strategy, even in the face of negative results (i.e., draws and losses),
unlike those in the other experiments. The fact that participants did
slightly worse in the third block in which inaccurate instructions were
presented indicates that although the verbal instructions provided at the
start of the block were merely brief descriptions of the probabilities they
were at least to some extent followed in spite of their inaccuracy, as shown
in that participants kept choosing to stay in spite of being unsuccessful. As
has been suggested in the literature, one important factor in the likelihood
of instructions promoting “insensitivity” is the extent at which they are
incompatible or discrepant with the actual contingencies. Although our
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instructions were of course inaccurate, participants could still go by them
and win every now and then, a suboptimal strategy, certainly, but not
completely bad. Following instructions is, to put it in lay terms, a “good
enough” strategy, particularly as the negative consequences of draws and
loses in these experiments are not particularly salient.
Interestingly, and related to this last point, our results replicate
some of the findings regarding strategy in the rock-paper-scissors study by
Dyson and colleagues (2016): our participants, like theirs, tended to stay
more following draws than losses and, when switching, they tended to favor
upgrading after draws and to favor downgrading following losses. It is not
possible to ascertain the reason for such pattern of preferences with the
present data, although an important possibility that needs to be explored
more precisely might be related to the phenomenon of loss aversion. In
support of this possibility, one of the factors that appear to enhance more
reliably the sensitivity to contingencies in experiments studying
instructional control under schedules of reinforcement is the introduction of
punishment contingencies (like “response cost”) for the failure to respond
according to contingencies (e.g., losing monetary rewards; Fox & Kyonka,
2017; Fox & Pietras, 2013; Galizio, 1979; Hackenberg & Joker, 1994).
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5. General Discussion
David Premack is an experimental psychologist that is better known for
coining the interesting –and very problematic– notion of “theory of mind.”
Before that, however, he was better known by a less controversial and
arguably more fruitful development, which carries his name: the Premack
Principle (Premack, 1965). Although the basic idea behind this principle, the
notion that high-probability activities can be used to reinforce lowprobability ones, is very well known, the conceptual and potentially
revolutionary implications of his ideas are unfortunately less understood
(Killeen, 2014).
The fundamental point in Premack’s ideas is that “reinforcers” are not
things, or more precisely that “things” don’t reinforce behavior. Instead, he
proposed, activities reinforce other activities: Food is not necessarily the
reinforcer, but eating; salaries are not reinforcers, but what you do with
them is reinforcing. This is more than merely a linguistic turn: By
emphasizing reinforcement in terms of activities not only is the
traditionally hedonistic notion of reinforcement as pleasure discredited, but
a more complex and dynamic notion of reinforcement is advanced. In
particular, further refinements on Premack’s ideas determined that for an
activity to function as a reinforcer all that is required is that it is
prevented (for whatever reason) from occurring at the frequency at which it
normally does.
For instance, a rat in a traditional learning experiment isn’t allowed
to eat as much or as often as it does. Since eating is occurring below its
usual frequency, it can now be used as a powerful consequence for another
activity, say, pressing a lever. As can be inferred, this approach suggests a
sort of behavioral homeostasis in that organisms would work to be able to
reach a previous pattern of activity. Since for the rat this means, however,
increased effort, the rat will settle for an optimal pattern that will allow
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it to approach as much as possible the desired level of activity with as
little effort as necessary. It is this emphasis in optimality that made
possible an alliance of sorts with evolutionary biologists interested in
adaptation (e.g., optimal foraging theory) and economists interested in, for
instance, maximization of utility, in what is now called “behavioral
economics.”
Our understanding of optimal allocation of behavior is, to date,
largely incomplete (see Grace & Hucks, 2013, and Staddon, 2001, for reviews)
but one of the most surprising conclusions of this literature is that under
some conditions humans behave suboptimally in tasks in which individuals of
other species behave optimally. Herbranson and Schroeder (2010), for example,
found that while pigeons used an optimal strategy in a version of the Monty
Hall dilemma, undergraduate students failed to adopt such an optimal
strategy. Another instance of suboptimal human choice versus optimal choice
in other species is the famous sunk-cost effect (e.g., Arkes & Ayton, 1999;
see also Fantino, 2012), that refers to tendency to persist in a decision
after one has invested money or effort on it.
The approach to the phenomenon of behavioral rigidity/flexibility that
has been advanced in the present document has emphasized, likewise,
optimality. Participants in the three experiments played a computerized
version of the old Rock, Paper, Scissors game in which the probabilities that
the computer would play one option were systematically manipulated across
blocks. The Rock, Paper, Scissors game resembles to a large extent a set of
problems in probability theory that are often referred to as “bandit games”
(see e.g., Berry, & Fristedt, 1985). The “bandits” in the name refer to the
situation in which a gambler has a large number of slot machines (“one-armed
bandits”) to play, each with a different probability. The gambler has a
limited amount of money or time, so a dilemma is created regarding which of
the machines should be played and for how long. The key issue here is that
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there is a tradeoff for the gambler: should he stick to a relatively good
machine (“exploitation”) or should he attempt others that might be more
profitable (“exploration”)?
One key distinction between the Rock-Paper-Scissors (RPS) game and the
basic bandit game is that unlike the latter, the opponent in an RPS game also
adapts his strategy with each repetition of the game (a so-called
“adversarial bandit”). Because of this, as Dyson et al. (2016) point out,
Rock-Paper-Scissors is interesting insofar as no particular strategy will
ensure success. According to the analysis of Dyson and colleagues, under
natural circumstances where players are attempting to beat each other it
should be expected that players would choose each of the options “with a
random distribution but equal probability (33.33%)” (p. 1).
By manipulating the probabilities across blocks, as originally proposed
by Kangas et al. (2009), the game becomes “beatable,” and as their results
show, it would be expected for players to adapt to these changed
probabilities by increasing the frequency of the appropriate counter-choice.
The fact that in general our participants, as well as those of the experiment
by Lie et al. (2013) undermatched the programmed probabilities suggests that
this paradigm is overall useful in determining the occurrence of suboptimal
choice. Undermatching isn’t uncommon in studies of choice with human
participants, even in experiments that attempt to resemble more those
conducted in traditional operant boxes with animals of other species by, for
example, using a lever as an apparatus, or particularly by increasing the
number and duration of experimental sessions (see Pierce & Epling, 1983) for
a review.
The present task differs in two important respects from most
traditional literature on the allocation of behavior under concurrent
schedules of reinforcement. First, instead of a two-choice alternative, this
task involves allocation among three choices. In their literature review
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Kangas et al. (2009) noticed that at least with nonhumans the generalized
matching equation appeared to describe allocation to more than just two
alternatives just as well, and the fact that their participants did
demonstrate matching seems to support this result. The second critical
difference is that instead of the typical concurrent variable interval (VI)
schedules of reinforcement often used in matching research, this task
involves instead probability matching. The main difference here lies in that
in the typical procedure, while the organism is responding to one choice, the
other alternative remains available. In the present design, instead, choosing
one option eliminates (for that trial) the other two alternatives. As pointed
out by Kangas et al., probabilistic schedules tend to produce exclusive
allocation to the most probable alternative, and might be better described by
a model different to that of matching.
That being said, it’s important to remember that the original interest
in this task isn’t so much in how well does matching describe the data, but
in whether this is a useful paradigm to understand rigid decision making. One
critical factor that appeared to be related to the differences between the
results of our experiments and those by Kangas et al. (2003), and to some
extent those by Lie et al. (2013) was the length of exposure to the
experimental contingencies, both of which involved a much larger amount of
trials per block. In the traditional paradigm used with other species,
animals are often exposed to the experimental contingencies in daily sessions
that can extend for weeks. In humans, even in those cases where participants
were exposed to daily sessions this didn’t mean warranty of matching (e.g.,
Horne & Lowe, 1993; Takahashi & Shikamura, 1998). Furthermore, since the
matching model emphasizes behavior that has reached a steady state, it has
been suggested that it might be an inappropriate model to understand
dynamical changes in transitional states (e.g., Grace & Hucks, 2013), which
appears to be particularly relevant to the problem of rigidity herein
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explored. It is for this reason precisely that a consensus is being created
that, at least as regards choice in transition, matching will be soon
discarded as model in favor of more complete ones (see McDowell, 2013 for a
review of some of the alternatives). In summary, although our results suggest
some limitations of the Rock, Paper, Scissors game as a paradigm for the
study of rigid patterns of behavior, the fact that it has allowed as to
identify order effects and the fact that it allowed an important measure of
instructional control suggest that the task has potential to further study
dynamic effects in the allocation of behavior.
An unanticipated result across our three experiments was the absence of
a systematic effect of our social manipulation, at least in regards to
performance. Shteynberg (2015) reviewed a variety of studies using a variety
of manipulations demonstrating reliable and systematic effects of believing
that someone was coattending to the same set of circumstances. This shared
attention meant generally a facilitating or strengthening effect, indicative
of greater devotion of cognitive resources (e.g, attention, memory) to the
targets of such shared attention. In the present experiments, in contrast, a
coattending presence didn’t appear to affect positively or negatively the
participants’ performances in our task. Shared attention appeared to decrease
the frequency of the “lose-shift” strategy following draws versus losses in
our first experiment. In the second experiment, which involved the sequential
manipulation of the discrepancies among choice probabilities, shared
attention appeared to actually work against optimality when in an increasing
difficulty sequence by slightly reducing the prevalence of staying as a
strategy. Shared attention didn’t modulate either the effect of accurate or
inaccurate instructions in Experiment 3, even if unlike the previous
experiments participants were explicitly encouraged to work cooperatively,
which putatively should have increased the devotion of cognitive resources to
the detection of discrepancies in the contingencies. If anything,
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participants in the Shared Attention condition appeared to adopt a strategy
(e.g., staying) more coherently throughout blocks, which might point out to a
certain rigidization of behavior, even though it didn’t actually affect
performance.
As is the case with all negative results, the exact reason for which no
reliable, systematic effect of shared attention was found is obscure and will
require further testing. There are of course many possible explanations. For
one, the use of a creativity task to enhance feelings of “sameness” or
“closeness” in participants might have been not strong enough. Furthermore,
although participants in the 3rd experiment were encouraged to cooperate,
future manipulations could make the task genuinely collaborative in that
optimal performance from both participants would be required to achieve a
particular end or to get access to a commonly preferred consequence. It is
also possible, of course, that due to the characteristics of the task, like
its repetitive nature or the relatively low level of strategizing required to
win (with children being outstanding rivals to adults, as pointed out by
Dyson et al., 2016), or fatigue or boredom, shared attention might not play
any important role. Only systematic replications of the paradigm in other
learning tasks will determine whether this is the case.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to provide
evidence for strong order effects depending on the sequence of presentation
of the experimental contingencies in studies of human behavior allocation.
Although more research is required to determine exactly what is it that tends
to alter the participants’ performance when exposed first to either saliently
different or indifferent discrepancies in the probabilities for choice, a
strong candidate for these results is the participants’ verbal behavior as
they are exposed to the contingencies. As Schoenfeld and Cumming (1963)
suggested, it is an unfortunate problem in research with human participants
that instructions of all sorts are provided to them with little or no
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consideration of the effect they might have or even if they have been
understood (cf. Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).
Schoenfeld and Cumming advanced a model to understand the function of
instructions that seems worthy to be described. According to their view,
instructions tend to originate a “perseverative rather than transient”
response (they call it “instruction response” or Ri) which persists throughout
an experimental session continuously modifying the stimulus variables that
participants are being exposed to. Schoenfeld and Cumming speculate that such
response probably consists mainly of patterns of subvocal speech which under
some circumstances might effectively override effective control by other
independent variables. Our study is the first to our knowledge to present
participants with inaccurate descriptions of contingencies in a behavior
allocation task. Although participants continued to win at higher levels, a
small but significant reduction in wins occurred in this block with provides
some measure of increased “insensitivity” to contingencies, and which was
also reflected in altered patterns of strategy, compared with conditions
where no instructions were delivered.
A similar case for the role the participants’ self-delivered
instructions has been suggested in the case of supobtimal choice in the socalled sunk-cost dilemma (e.g., Arkes & Ayton, 1999), who noticed that
children are less affected by it and might actually behave more optimally
than adults. Adults, according to these authors, tend to behave suboptimally
often in such tasks because they don’t want to “appear to be wasteful,” among
other heuristics. Although more direct evidence is required, the fact that
providing verbal instructions had such dramatic effects on participants’
performance (i.e, more wins) and strategy (an increased frequency of
“staying” even in the face of losses) appear to support this approach. These
verbal instructions were both beneficial and detrimental for participants in
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these experiments. On the one hand, they produced the most success of all
manipulations across experiments. On the other hand, the participants’
strategy rigidized as a function of their success, leading to slightly lower
proportions of winning. A number of further instructional manipulations needs
to be conducted in conjunction with our probability manipulations to more
precisely ascertain the roles these self-provided and experimenter-provided
instructions might play in the allocation of behavior in tasks like the
current one.
A final aspect that will require further experimental exploration, and
that might be related to this last point is related to the differential
effect that draws and losses appeared to have in the participants’ strategy,
as reflected in a tendency to stay more following draws, which our data
suggested might have been enhanced by shared attention. This effect might be
related to the long-known phenomenon of “loss aversion” (Kahneman & Tversky,
1979), and might be related to the shared attention effects insofar as social
coattention might enhance the salience of losses. Although anecdotal,
participants in our shared attention conditions reported reduced enjoyment of
the task compared to participants in the solo condition. If this is to some
extent an accurate representation, future studies involving differential
consequences for losses versus draws might provide some insight into the
possibility of the loss aversion effect being moderated by social
contingencies like shared attention.
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Table 2.1
Shared Attention Conditions for the Pilot Experiment
Conditions

Co-attending
Observer

Response
Feedback

Outcome
Feedback

Alone
(Group 1)

No

Yes

Yes

SharedOutcomeOnly
(Group 2)

Yes

No

Yes

Shared
Performance
& Outcome
(Group 3)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Note: Response feedback consisted in auditory description of the participant response
(e.g., “Paper” when the corresponding choice was selected). Outcome feedback
consisted in auditory feedback corresponding to the outcome of the trial (e.g.,
applause if the trial was a win).
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Table 3. 1
Experimental Conditions in Experiment 2
Conditions

Co-attending
Observer

Response
Feedback

Outcome
Feedback

Discriminability
Sequence

Alone HtE
(Group 1)

No

Yes

Yes

Hard-to-Easy

SharedOutcome- Only
HtE
(Group 2)

Yes

No

Yes

Hard-to-Easy

Shared
Performance &
Outcome HtE
(Group 3)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Hard-to-Easy

Alone EtH
(Group 4)

No

Yes

Yes

Easy-to-Hard

SharedOutcome- Only
EtH (Group 5)

Yes

No

Yes

Easy-to-Hard

Shared
Performance &
Outcome
EtH(Group 6)

Yes

Yes

Yes

Easy-to-Hard

Note: Discriminability sequence refers to the varying degrees of discrepancy in the
probability that the computer will choose a particular option, ranging from
“Hard,” where the computer chooses each option with the same probability, to
“Easy,” where the computer chooses one option 80% of the time. In the Hard-toEasy sequence, the computer starts with equal probability and starts to
increase the probability of choosing one option across blocks. In the Easy-toHard sequence, the computer starts by choosing one option with the highest
probability (80% of the time) and that probability starts decreasing across
blocks until in the final block each option is played 33% of the time.
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Table 3.2
Sensitivity and Bias Parameters of the GML Analysis for Pairs of Choices
across Conditions
Hard to Easy

Solo

Shared Outcome Only

Shared Outcome &
Feedback

Easy to Hard

S

b

R2

s

b

R2

R/P

0.46

0.06

0.51

0.547

0.052

0.707

R/S

0.45

0.03

0.58

0.470

0.068

0.739

P/S

0.36

0.01

0.54

0.474

0.015

0.677

R/P

0.343

0.028

0.538

0.392

0.048

0.704

R/S

0.418

0.054

0.652

0.492

0.032

0.698

P/S

0.335

0.031

0.566

0.502

0.028

0.759

R/P

0.374

0.003

0.648

0.462

0.062

0.687

R/S

0.433

0.063

0.574

0.393

0.087

0.603

P/S

0.362

0.062

0.590

0.376

0.022

0.674
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Table 3.3
Correlation Between Performance and Strategy Outcomes & Self-Report Measures
Diffic
Perceived
Difficulty
Enjoyment

Enjoy

Satisf

Liking

Close

Wins

Draw

Lose

Stay

Upgr

Downgr

.21**

-.02

-.185*

-.06

-.08

-.04

.15

-.01

.05

-.04

.37**

.10

.05

-.08

.08

.03

-.13

.13

.10

.06

.04

.26**

.00

-.36**

.04

-.02

-.06

.46**

-.12

.02

.13

-.10

.04

.13

-.08

.06

.04

-.05

.04

.04

-.65**

-.68**

.59**

-.48**

-.53**

-.11

-.44**

.39**

.37**

-.35**

.25**

.34**

-.87**

-.85**

.21**

Satisfaction
with

-.02

.37**

-.19*

.10

.06

Closeness

-.06

.05

.04

.46**

Wins

-.08

-.08

.26**

-.12

-.08

Draws

-.04

.08

.00

.02

.06

-.65**

Loses

.15

.03

-.36**

.13

.04

-.68**

-.11

-.01

-.13

.04

-.10

-.05

.58**

-.44**

-.35**

.05

.13

-.02

.04

.04

-.47**

.39**

.25**

-.87**

-.04

.10

-.06

.13

.04

-.53**

.37**

.34**

-.85**

Performance
Partner
Liking

Stay
Upgrade
Downgrade

.48**
.48**

* p<.05
** p<.001
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Table 4.1
Correlation Matrix for the TIPI Personality Measure and the Other Self-Report Measures in Experiment 3
Extrav

Agree

Consc

Emot

Open

Diffic

Enjoy

Satisf

Liking

Close

Extraversion
Agreeableness
Conscientiousness
Emotional
Stability
Openness to
Experience
Difficulty

-.18
-.01

-.18
.00

-.01
.00
-

.08
-.02
.17

.17
.16
.02

.03
.00
.03

-.10
.02
.08

-.04
.05
.06

.07
-.04
.23

-.08
.24
.05

.08

-.02

.17

-

.01

-.14

.190*

.291**

.08

-.06

.17

.16

.02

.01

-

-.10

.03

.00

.03

-.14

Task Enjoyment

-.10

.02

.08

.190*

-.10
.217*

-.04

.05

.06

.291**

.07
-.08

-.04
.24

.23
.05

.08
-.06

Satisfaction with
Performance
Partner Liking
Partner Closeness

.13

-.05

-.06

-

.217*
.11

-.13

.03

.04

.11

-

.16

.268*

.23

.13

-.13

.16

-

.21

.21

-.05
-.06

.03
.04

.268*
.23

.21
.21

.486**

.486**
-
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Table 4.2
Correlation Matrix for the TIPI Personality Measure and the Performance and Strategy of Participants in
Experiment 3

.006

WinStay
-.009

WinUpgr
-.028

WinDowng
-.024

LossStay
-.032

LossUpgr
-.103

LossDowng
.162

DrawStay
.009

DrawUpgr
.125

DrawDowngr
-.151

.069

-.060

.075

.074

-.057

-.014

-.013

-.026

.035

.123

.146

.062

-.102

.133

.042

-.071

.159

.076

-.098

.086

.035

.059

-.055

-.059

.082

-.042

-.063

.024

.055

-.079

.020

-.121

.004

-.128

.025

.013

-.062

.064

-.017

-.066

-.067

-.101

.023

.016

.115

-.126

.059

.154

.260**

.268**

.234*

.229*

.215*

.175

.208*

.237*

.208*

.232*

.223*

.205*

-.040

-.092

.131

-.087

.081

.087

-.081

.078

.083

-.039

.207*

.016

-.093

-.039

.129

.30**

-.181

-.186

.203*

-.210*

-.182

.190*

-.098

-.047

.158

-.154

.246**

.166

.26**

-.166

-.14

.313**

-.111

-.121

.125

.112

-.126

.073

.100

.280*

.068

.133

.038

.16

.044

.11

-.012

-.113

.076

-.080

-.069

.045

.029

-.005

.048

-.113

-.076

.112

-.111

-.105

Wins

Draws

Extraversion

-.065

Agreeableness
Conscientiousness
Emotional
Stability
Openness to
Experience

-.004

Difficulty
Task
Enjoyment
Satisfaction
with
Performance
Partner
Liking
Partner
Closeness

Loses

Stay

Upgr

Downg

.036

.043

-.010

.013

.097

-.083

-.057

.042

-.088

-.024

.123

-.108

.092

-.109

-.008

.069

.054

-.18

* p<.05
**p.<001
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Figure 2.1. A prototypical trial configuration.
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Figure 2.2. Mean proportion of correct and incorrect (i.e., ties and
losses) attempts for participants in the tree experimental conditions as a
function of the type of block, random (i.e., the block where the computer
chose each alternative with equal probability), or non-random (comprising the
three blocks at which the computer chose one alternative with a higher
probability).
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Figure 2.3. Proportion of correct and incorrect (i.e., draws and
losses) attempts for participants in the three experimental conditions across
blocks. The upper panel corresponds to random blocks (i.e., blocks where the
computer chose all alternatives with the same probability), while the bottom
panel corresponds to the strategy in non-random blocks (i.e., those where the
computer chose one alternative with a higher probability).
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Figure 2.4. Proportion of correct and incorrect (i.e., draws and
losses) attempts for participants in the three experimental conditions across
block portion. The upper panel corresponds to random blocks (i.e., blocks
where the computer chose all alternatives with the same probability), while
the bottom panel corresponds to the strategy in non-random blocks (i.e.,
those where the computer chose one alternative with a higher probability).
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Figure 2.5. Log response ratios as a function of log reinforcement
ratios for participants in the Solo condition of Experiment 1. The left panel
depicts results for the entire blocks, while the right panel depicts results
from trials from the latter half of each block.
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Figure 2.6. Log response ratios as a function of log reinforcement
ratios for participants in the Shared-Outcome-Only condition of Experiment 1.
The left panel depicts results for the entire blocks, while the right panel
depicts results from trials from the latter half of each block.
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Figure 2.7. Log response ratios as a function of log reinforcement
ratios for participants in the Shared-Performance-&-Outcome condition of
Experiment 1. The left panel depicts results for the entire blocks, while the
right panel depicts results from trials from the latter half of each block.

80

Figure 2.8. Estimated marginal means of the response times across
blocks, across block types, and across block portion for the participants in
the three experimental groups.
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0.0

Rock Scissors Paper

Rock Scissors Paper

Rock Scissors Paper

Alone

Shared-Outcome-Only

Shared-Outcome-&Performance

Figure 2.9. Overall strategy at trial n + 1 as a function of the
selection at trial n for participants in the three experimental conditions.
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Figure 2.10. Strategy at trial n + 1 as a function of the outcome of
trial n for participants in the three experimental conditions. The upper
panel corresponds to random blocks (i.e., blocks where the computer chose all
alternatives with the same probability), while the bottom panel corresponds
to the strategy in non-random blocks (i.e., those where the computer chose
one alternative with a higher probability).
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Figure 2.11. Strategy at trial n + 1 as a function of the outcome of
trial n across (non-random) blocks for participants in the three experimental
conditions. Random blocks have been excluded.
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Figure 2.12. Strategy at trial n + 1 as a function of the outcome of
trial n across (non-random) block portion (each portion corresponding to one
fourth of the block) for participants in the three experimental conditions.
Random blocks have been excluded.
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Figure 2.13. Variations in bias and sensitivity to reinforcement
according to the generalized matching equation (taken from Reed & Kaplan,
2001, p. 17).
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Figure 3.1. Mean proportion of overall correct and incorrect (i.e.,
draws and losses) attempts for participants in the tree experimental
conditions as a function of the sequence of probability presentations.
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Figure 3.2. Proportion of correct and incorrect (i.e., draws and
losses) attempts for participants in the three experimental conditions across
blocks.
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Figure 3.3. Proportion of correct and incorrect (i.e., draws and
losses) attempts for participants in the three experimental conditions across
block portions of 15 trials each.
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Figure 3.4. Overall strategy at trial n + 1 as a function of the
selection at trial n for participants in the sequence conditions and in the
three experimental conditions.
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Figure 3.5. Strategy at trial n + 1 as a function of the selection of
trial n for participants in the three experimental conditions across blocks.
The left panel corresponds to the decreasing difficulty (Hard-to-Easy)
sequence, while the right panel corresponds to the strategy in the increasing
difficulty (Easy-to-Hard) sequence.
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Figure 3.6. Strategy at trial n + 1 as a function of the selection of
trial n for participants in the three experimental conditions across block
portions of 15 trials. The left panel corresponds to the Hard-to-Easy
sequence, while the right panel corresponds to the strategy in the Easy-toHard sequence.
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Figure 3.7. Overall strategy at trial n + 1 as a function of the
outcome of trial n for participants collapsed across the three social
conditions and the two difficulty sequences.
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Figure 3.8. Strategy at trial n + 1 as a function of the outcome of
trial n for all participants.
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Figure 3.9. Strategy at trial n + 1 as a function of the outcome of
trial n across blocks for participants in all experimental conditions.
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Figure 3.10. Log response ratios as a function of log reinforcement
ratios for participants in the Solo condition. The left panel depicts results
for the Hard-to-Easy sequence, while the right panel depicts results from the
Easy-to-Hard sequence.
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Figure 3.11. Log response ratios as a function of log reinforcement
ratios for participants in the Shared Outcome Only condition. The left panel
depicts results for the Hard-to-Easy sequence, while the right panel depicts
results from the Easy-to-Hard sequence.
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Figure 3.12. Log response ratios as a function of log reinforcement
ratios for participants in the Shared Attention & Feedback condition. The
left panel depicts results for the Hard-to-Easy sequence, while the right
panel depicts results from the Easy-to-Hard sequence.
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Figure 4.1. Mean proportion of overall correct (wins) and incorrect
(i.e., draws and losses) attempts for participants in the two experimental
conditions.
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Figure 4.2. Mean proportion of overall correct and incorrect (i.e.,
draws and losses) attempts across blocks for participants in the experimental
conditions, Solo (left panel) and Shared Attention (right panel).
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Figure 4.3. Overall strategy at trial n + 1 as a function of the
selection at trial n for participants in the Solo (left) and Shared Attention
(right) conditions.
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Figure 4.4. Overall strategy at trial n + 1 as a function of the
selection at trial n across blocks for participants in the Solo (left) and
Shared Attention (right) conditions.
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Figure 4.5. Overall strategy at trial n + 1 as a function of the
outcome of trial n for participants in the Solo (left) and Shared Attention
(right) conditions.
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Figure 4.6. Strategy at trial n + 1 as a function of the outcome of
trial n for participants in the Solo (left) and Shared Attention (right)
conditions across blocks.
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Figure 4.7. Proportions of wins, draws, and losses across successive
block portions of 10 trials each in Block 2 (Accurate Instructions, left
panel) and Block 3 (Inaccurate Instructions, right panel) for participants of
the two conditions, Solo (upper panel), and Shared Attention (lower panel).
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Figure 4.8. Proportions of strategies (i.e., staying, upgrading,
downgrading) at trial n + 1 as a function of trial n across successive block
portions of 10 trials each in Block 2 (Accurate Instructions, left panel) and
Block 3 (Inaccurate Instructions, right panel) for participants of the two
conditions, Solo (upper panel), and Shared Attention (lower panel).
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Figure 4.9. Proportions of strategies (i.e., staying, upgrading,
downgrading) at trial n + 1 as a function of the outcome of trial n (i.e.,
win, draw, or lose) across successive block portions of 10 trials each in
Block 2 (Accurate Instructions) and Block 3 (Inaccurate Instructions) for
participants of the two conditions, Solo (left panels) and Shared Attention
(right panels).
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